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1. Introduction 
 
Algorithmic trading makes up an increasingly large share of the $5.1 trillion-a-day 
turnover in the global foreign exchange (FX) market. Although no precise figures are 
available, estimates suggest that algorithms account for around 25% of the trading in 
the FX spot market in 2010 (King and Rime, 2010). Today, the share is undoubtedly 
higher. Whereas proponents of algorithmic trading generally highlight benefits in 
terms of efficiency, competition, liquidity and hence lower transaction costs and an 
enhanced price discovery process (see, for instance, Bershova and Rakhlin, 2013; 
Broogard et al., 2014; Conrad et al., 2015; Hendershott et al., 2011; Stoll, 2014), the 
development is not without controversy. Some critics point out that algorithmic 
traders, and high-frequency traders in particular, by being able to react and anticipate 
order flow faster, ultimately ‘crowd out’ the liquidity traditionally provided by human 
traders at market making banks.  
 
The vast majority of the academic research so far has been conducted on stock 
markets. However, surveys and studies suggest that algorithmic trading in the FX 
markets has resulted in similar outcomes as in other financial markets: tighter bid-ask 
spreads, higher turnover, a more substantial number of (small) orders and a reduction 
in the average lifetime of orders (BIS, 2011; Susai and Yoshida, 2015). Overall, it 
appears as if algorithmic traders have contributed to better market liquidity in a range 
of financial markets, at least during periods of stability. However, by reacting very 
fast to new information, including to new orders submitted by others, markets 
primarily populated with algorithmic traders have also become susceptible to a 
withdrawal of liquidity at an unprecedented speed and scale (Fong and Liu, 2010; 
Foucault et al., 2005).  
 
In this paper, we conduct an empirical cross-country study into volume-based 
liquidity in the FX market.1 We explore both the liquidity provision as well as the 
liquidity withdrawal process. However, the emphasis of our analysis and discussion is 
on the latter. More specifically, we calculate the change in the liquidity within pre-
specified time windows following each new limit order submission to the limit order 
                                                        
1 A detailed review of various definitions of ‘liquidity’ is beyond the scope of this paper. We use a 
volume or quantity dimension of liquidity (see, for instance, Holden et al., 2013). 
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book – and then analyse the results through the lens of the specific characteristics of 
that limit order and the state of the market at the time of submission.  
 
Our paper is related to the FX market microstructure literature that covers limit order 
submission strategies (Lo and Sapp, 2010), order flow (Lyons, 1997; Evans and 
Lyons, 2002; Payne, 2003; Daníelsson et al., 2012) and liquidity provision (Bjønnes 
et al., 2005; Daníelsson and Payne, 2012). However, empirical work on FX markets 
has hitherto been limited to datasets using indicative quotes, transactions or limit 
orders before the introduction of high-frequency FX trading – presumably due to the 
difficulty in obtaining full electronic limit order book data. Having gained access to a 
full book high-frequency dataset provided by Electronic Broking Services (EBS) from 
8–13 September 2010 enables us to put the electronic FX market under the 
microscope. Our study, which includes eight currency pairs, incorporates more than 3 
million limit orders, worth over $5 trillion (see Table 1).  
 
< Table 1: Overview of the currency pairs and limit order submissions >  
 
Furthermore, by choosing volume-based liquidity as a lens, our focus could also be 
seen from the perspective of overall market quality. A growing body of papers 
address topics such as pre-trade transparency, hidden liquidity and dark pools in 
equity markets (see, in particular, Bessembinder et al., 2009; Bloomfield et al., 2015; 
Boehmer et al., 2005). However, the FX market is decentralised and has traditionally 
been highly opaque. Indeed, differences between the two markets are essential to 
stress, as they have implications not only for our approach and methodology but also 
for the relevance and contribution of the paper as a whole. 
 
First, regarding daily traded volume, the global stock markets are dwarfed by the size 
of the decentralised FX market. However, whereas there are tens of thousands of 
tradable stocks, the number of actively traded currency pairs is relatively few. In 
2013, the top-5 accounted for 61.7% and the top-20 for 86.4% of the global turnover 
(BIS, 2013). To enable us to investigate differences among currencies and markets in 
our study, we have chosen three categories of currency pairs. The first category 
includes the three most actively traded currency pairs (EUR/USD, USD/JPY and 
EUR/JPY), which, due to the substantial turnover, have been at the forefront of 
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algorithm trading. The second category contains two smaller G10 currency pairs 
(EUR/SEK and EUR/NOK). According to BIS (2013), the Swedish krona and the 
Norwegian krone were ranked 11th and 14th in terms of market turnover in 2013. The 
third category (USD/MXN, USD/RUB and USD/TRY) includes three of the most 
actively traded emerging market currencies in two different time zones: the Mexican 
peso, the Russian ruble and the Turkish lira. All three have seen phenomenal growth 
in turnover during the last 10–15 years and were ranked 8th, 12th and 16th in terms of 
global FX turnover in 2013.2 
 
Second, the FX market is, in contrast to the stock market, overwhelmingly 
unregulated and free from circuit breakers. As academics, policymakers and 
numerous market participants have pointed out; better market liquidity has had a 
tendency to be accompanied by a ‘liquidity illusion’ or a ‘liquidity mirage’ (King and 
Rime, 2011; ESRB, 2016). Therefore, volume-based liquidity withdrawal en masse 
during times of stress could act as an “amplifying mechanism” (BIS, 2017a) and, due 
to the inherently international nature of the FX market, have a more devastating 
impact on the global financial system (BIS, 2011; Harris, 2013). A flash crash, for 
instance, is not only associated with sudden and violent price moves but ultimately 
also by a rapid disappearance of limit order volume, permitting or triggering 
transactions to take place at prices outside a trading range that would otherwise be 
considered as ‘normal’. The Flash Crash of 2010 or the Pound Flash Crash in October 
2016 are, of course, extreme examples. However, an unexpected event in the form of 
a surprise central bank announcement or currency intervention may also lead to a 
sudden withdrawal of liquidity as measured by volume.3 Typically, the impact of such 
events on the market liquidity tends to be temporary. However, if human market 
makers become less confident in their ability to not only supply but also demand 
instant liquidity, overall market quality may suffer in the long run (Stenfors and Susai, 
                                                        
2 Although the share of algorithmic trading on EBS rose from 2% in 2004 to around 50% in 2010, 
anecdotal evidence and surveys among banks suggest that the change has been most visible among the 
major currency pairs. Whereas medium-sized currency pairs also have seen an influx of algorithm 
trading, the vast majority of the small currencies are still reliant on the market making function 
provided by human traders at banks (King and Rime, 2010; BIS, 2011). However, anecdotal evidence 
from market participants indicates that some major emerging market currency pairs have witnessed a 
rapid transformation from human towards algorithmic trading in recent years – including the three in 
our study. 
3 For a good summary of recent events involving sharp intraday moves in the FX market, see BIS 
(2017a).  
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2018). Thus, the issue of liquidity withdrawal is of particular importance in over-the-
counter (OTC) markets such as FX, which rely on voluntary market making – a 
function traditionally performed by commercial banks, but increasingly populated by 
high-frequency traders.  
 
Third, volume-based FX liquidity withdrawal is of interest not only to academics and 
market participants. Notably, central banks, too, increasingly resort to electronic 
trading platforms such as EBS for currency interventions (Vitale, 2006). It is also of 
relevance to regulators and compliance officers. Since the revelations of widespread 
manipulation and collusive behaviour in the FX spot market (see, for instance, CFTC, 
2014), the market making function performed by traders, whether human or 
algorithmic, has come under intense scrutiny. Recent criminal convictions and 
regulatory settlements suggest that markets highly populated with algorithmic limit 
orders could be particularly susceptible to manipulative trading tactics such as 
spoofing (CFTC, 2018). Although most jurisdictions do not explicitly outlaw 
spoofing in the OTC FX markets, the new voluntary Global FX Code highlights that 
‘Market Participants should not […] create orders with the intention of disrupting 
market functioning or hindering the price discovery process, including undertaking 
actions designed to result in a false impression of market price, depth, or liquidity’ 
(BIS, 2017b). In February 2018, the Bank of England and the UK Financial Conduct 
Authority issued a joint statement proposing to bring algorithmic trading in the 
wholesale markets (mentioning FX in particular) under their supervision (Bank of 
England, 2018; FCA, 2018). Put together; recent developments are likely to 
necessitate a more in-depth understanding about limit order books involving FX and 
algorithms. 
 
Our paper, therefore, provides a fresh and original contribution to the already 
extensive market microstructure literature on price-based liquidity provision in FX 
markets, as well as on algorithmic trading and limit order markets (hitherto almost 
exclusively conducted on stock markets). Overall, we find that market participants 
react differently to changes in the state of the market (such as volatility and the bid-
ask spread) for different currency pairs. Moreover, the liquidity withdrawal process 
also differs depending on the perceived information content of new limit orders 
submitted to the market (e.g. size and price aggressiveness). Perhaps most crucially, 
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we document that a ‘liquidity illusion’ might, indeed, exist in FX spot markets where 
algorithmic and high-frequency trading is prominent. Thus, we report several 
empirical findings that not only contribute to the literature on FX market 
microstructure, but also tackle conventional ‘market wisdom’ with regards to FX 
trading behaviour on electronic trading platforms. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related 
literature and Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 outlines the methodology and 
the two methods used to investigate the liquidity withdrawal process. The descriptive 
statistics and a discussion of the results are provided in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
The market microstructure literature on limit order cancellations, or liquidity 
withdrawal more generally, is still limited. To some degree, this can be logically 
explained. Cancellation or withdrawal implies, per definition, that a trade has not been 
done. Thus, it could be argued that studies surrounding such ‘inaction’ in financial 
markets would have little to add to the understanding of financial market behaviour. 
However, the topic is by no means new among financial market participants. A new 
limit order submission does not only involve the choice of price and amount, but also 
an assessment of the state of the market - including the reaction to the limit order 
submitted by other market participants. A possible response is an almost immediate 
withdrawal of liquidity by others. Likewise, a trader or investor who has submitted a 
limit order not only observes the overall state of the market concerning that particular 
order, but might also react to changes in the limit order book by cancelling and, 
perhaps, resubmitting the limit order. 
 
In fact, although the important role of transactions and limit order flow for exchange 
rate determination is well established in the literature (see, for instance, Lyons, 1997; 
Evans and Lyons, 2002; Bjønnes et al., 2005), order cancellations remains an under-
research topic not only in FX markets, but also in other financial markets. Traditional 
theoretical market microstructure models saw limit orders mainly as passive trading 
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strategies, whereby informed traders, instead, resorted to market orders (Glosten, 
1994; Seppi, 1997). When seen from this perspective, it could be argued that the 
withdrawal of liquidity among non-informed and passive traders would add minimal 
insight into the dynamics of exchange rates or market microstructure theory more 
generally. However, limit orders have become considerably more prevalent in liquid 
financial markets as a preferred as an active trading strategy in recent years (Foucault, 
1999; Foucault et al., 2005; Rosu, 2009; Yeo, 2005). More sophisticated technology 
and the rise of algorithmic trading has, overall, led to a dramatic increase in the 
number and proportion of limit order submissions. This development has been well 
documented, for instance on the Paris Bourse (Biais et al., 1995), on NYSE (Harris 
and Hasbrouck, 1996; Yeo, 2005), the Stockholm Stock Exchange (Hollifield et al., 
2004) and on the Island ECN (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2002). Overall, it has resulted in a 
higher number and proportion of limit order cancellations and revisions, and a 
shortening of the lifetime of limit orders (Susai and Yoshida, 2014). Therefore, it is 
not surprising that events involving violent and sudden price moves have been 
observed in financial markets increasingly dominated by electronic trading platforms.  
 
More recently, theoretical models have accounted for the ability of traders to actively 
choose between market orders and limit orders (Foucault, 1999; Parlour, 1998; Rosu, 
2009). However, in contrast to market orders, limit orders may, or may not, be 
executed, and are therefore associated with monitoring costs as traders are required 
continuously to check the ‘pulse of the market’ (Fong and Liu, 2010; Liu, 2009). 
Thus, liquidity withdrawal may depend on a series of ‘market-specific’ variables. In 
this paper, we account for these factors by using proxies for market activity (Biais et 
al., 1995), market liquidity (or depth) (Yeo, 2005), price volatility (Foucault, 1999) 
and the bid-ask spread (Biais et al., 1995; Foucault, 2007). To some degree, parallels 
can be drawn to an extensive literature on price-based liquidity measures: in 
particular, the readily observable bid-ask spread. For instance, the bid-ask spread has 
been found to be negatively correlated with trading volume (Hartmann, 1998), proxies 
for market liquidity (Bassembinder 1994; Glassman 1987; Kaul and Sapp, 2006; 
Mende, 2006) and trading activity, order size and quoting frequency (Bollerslev and 
Domowitz, 1993; Glassman, 1987; Lyons, 1995; Melvin and Yin, 2000), but 
negatively correlated with price volatility (Bassembinder, 1994; Bollerslev and 
Melvin, 1994; Glassman, 1987; Hartmann, 1998).  
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However, we would also expect traders to pay specific attention to the information 
content of new incoming orders to the market, as a buy [sell] initiative is more likely 
to lead to a higher [lower] price (Bjønnes et al., 2005). Following such logic, a limit 
buy [sell] order ought to cause limit order cancellations on the opposite side as sellers 
[buyers] incorporate the new information and revise their price expectations 
accordingly. Traders withdrawing liquidity might then, perhaps, resubmit orders at a 
higher [lower] price. Thus, a limit order contains ‘free-option risk’, i.e. the risk of 
being picked off by a trader with private information (Copeland and Galai, 1983). 
However, traders on the same side also revise their expectations (and consequently 
cancel and resubmit their orders). They are less likely to be picked off. However, as 
the market is more likely to move against them, they face ‘non-execution risk’ 
(Hasbrouck and Saar, 2002; Liu, 2009). Consequently, traders may react differently 
depending on the characteristics of incoming orders to the market. To incorporate 
these ‘order-specific’ factors, we therefore also study variables linked to the strategic 
behaviour of the trader submitting the new limit order. Here, we include various 
measures of price aggressiveness. A market order is, per definition, an aggressive 
order as the intention is to execute a trade immediately at the prevailing best market 
price. However, the probability of a limit order being executed is dependent on how 
far away it is submitted from the market price (Griffiths et al., 2000; Cao et al., 2004; 
Ranaldo’ 2004). For a selection of currency pairs, we extend the model to account for 
order size and order-splitting strategies. As Lo and Sapp (2010) find, more aggressive 
limit orders in the FX market tend to be smaller in size, suggesting that there is a 
strategic trade-off between aggressiveness and size. A large limit order might be 
interpreted as market-moving and therefore trigger other traders to cancel their limit 
orders – thereby decreasing the likelihood of being filled. Indeed, several studies 
show that traders adopt order-splitting strategies in attempts to disguise the ‘true’ size 
of the limit order, thereby allowing them to submit relatively more aggressive orders 
without having the corresponding negative impact on the liquidity of the market. 
Order-spitting strategies might be adopted by ‘informed traders’ as well as ‘liquidity 
traders’ (Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1996). Whereas an informed trader would prefer 
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to disguise his private information as signalled by a large order submission, a trader 
demanding liquidity would want to hide his ‘full amount’ to avoid front-running.4  
 
In sum, short-term liquidity withdrawal is a multifaceted phenomenon and can stem 
from a multitude of sources. These can range from the overall state of the market at a 
particular moment in time to strategic limit order submission behaviour intended to 
achieve a trade execution at the best possible price - or perhaps even a trading strategy 
to assess the impact on liquidity provision by others. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
We use a high-frequency dataset (‘Data Mine Life Cycle Data for All Pairs’) from 
21:00:00 (GMT) on 8 September 2010 to 20:59:59 (GMT) on 13 September 2010 
(excluding the weekend) obtained from EBS, the most widely used electronic trading 
platform among market-making banks. As Table 1 shows, our study captures three 
trading days with low FX volatility. With a price range of approximately 1–2% for all 
currency pairs, the period ought to be suitable for a cross-country study under 
relatively comparable market conditions.  
 
On EBS, traders can either initiate a quote (submit a limit order) or match a posted 
quote (submit a market order). In the dataset we have acquired, all data entries are 
assigned one of five indicators (QS, QD, HS, HAD or DSM). A new limit order 
begins with QS (a limit order submission) and ends with QD (a limit order 
cancellation). A market order starts with HS and ends with HAD. When two 
counterparties are matched in a transaction on EBS, the information for the 
transaction is recorded as a DSM. In addition to price, volume, buy or sell indicator, 
we also use the millisecond timestamp. A unique 20-digit Trader ID is attached to 
each indicator, allowing us to match order submissions and order cancellations. 
However, the identities or institutions are not revealed.  
 
                                                        
4 On orders and order-splitting strategies, see, for instance: Chan and Lakonishok (1995), Engle et al. 
(2012), Pérold (1988) and Yeo (2005). 
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Market orders count for less than 1% of all orders in our dataset (consistent with the 
literature on high-frequency trading above, showing the increasing importance of 
limit orders on electronic trading platforms). Having filtered for limit order 
submissions and limit order cancellations only, and removed all new limit orders that 
do not have a corresponding cancellation within the same day (less than 0.005% of all 
limit order submissions), we are left with over 3 million limit orders submissions, 
worth more than $5 trillion.  
 
 
4. The models 
 
4.1 Dependent variables and time-windows 
 
Following each new limit order submission to the limit order book, we calculate the 
change in the market liquidity within pre-specified time windows. Computer 
algorithms can react faster than humans. We have therefore chosen seven different 
time windows (0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 5, 10 and 60 seconds) to investigate potential 
differences when allowing for human traders to have time to react – thus providing a 
deeper insight into the dynamics of the liquidity withdrawal process. Table 2 shows 
the average number of limit order cancellations following each new limit order 
submission within the chosen time windows.  
 
< Table 2: Average number of limit order cancellations following each new limit 
order submission (time window in seconds) > 
 
As can be seen, the number of limit order cancellations is remarkably high 
considering the relatively short time windows chosen. For instance, the EUR/SEK 
dataset contains 47,473 limit order cancellations. Assuming an even distribution over 
three 24-hour trading days, this represents an average of 0.018 order cancellations per 
0.1 seconds5, 0.183 order cancellations per 1 second and 10.989 order cancellations 
per 60 seconds. However, as Table 2 shows, the average is considerably higher for the 
corresponding time windows: 0.556 limit order cancellations within 0.1 seconds, 
                                                        
5 47,473/(3*24*60*60*10) = 0.018 
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3.219 within 1 second and 31.635 within 60 seconds. A similar pattern is displayed 
for all currency pairs, regardless whether they are actively traded around-the-clock 
(EUR/USD, USD/JPY and EUR/JPY) or whether the trading activity is more 
concentrated within one specific time zone (EUR/SEK, EUR/NOK, USD/MXN, 
USD/RUB and USD/TRY). However it is not the frequency of the cancellations, in 
itself, that stands out. Instead, it is the speed at which the extreme frequency decreases 
and then ‘normalises’. Consequently, it appears as if the frequency distribution of 
order cancellations in the FX spot market follows a power law. This is similar to what 
has been observed in the size of equity orders for stock markets where high-frequency 
traders are prominent (see, for instance, Gopikrishnan et al., 2000; Maslow and Mills, 
2001). Put differently, the liquidity withdrawal for the eight currency pairs is at its 
most extreme within a few hundred milliseconds (or “faster than a human can blink”) 
of each new limit order submission. Once human traders plausibly could have had 
time to react, the cancellation frequency has all but normalised, and we observe little 
change between 1 and 60 seconds. Thus, even though the time windows are short, 
they ought to capture the most relevant aspects of the liquidity withdrawal process.    
 
To investigate the liquidity withdrawal process, we then run regressions using the 
following two models:  
 
𝑀_𝐿𝑖
𝑡(𝑖)+𝑤 − 𝑀_𝐿𝑖
𝑡(𝑖) =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑀_𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑀_𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐵_𝐴𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑀𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑖 + 𝛿2𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑖 +
𝛿3𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑖 + 𝛿4𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝛿5𝑀𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑖 ∙ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿6𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑖 ∙ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿7𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑖 ∙ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (1) 
 
𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖
𝑡(𝑖)+𝑤 − 𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖
𝑡(𝑖)
=  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑀_𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑀_𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐵_𝐴𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑀𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑖 + 𝛿2𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑖 +
𝛿3𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑖 + 𝛿4𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝛿5𝑀𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑖 ∙ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿6𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑖 ∙ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿7𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑖 ∙ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (2) 
 
In the first model (Equation 1) the dependent variable is the change in the market 
liquidity within a specified time window (w), where w = 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 5, 10 or 60 
seconds following the ith limit order submission (𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑖). We measure market liquidity 
at each time stamp as the sum of the total amount (A) of outstanding limit buy and sell 
orders at the best market bid (bb) and best market ask (ba) prices respectively, 
immediately prior to the ith limit order submission. Hence, 𝑀_𝐿𝑡(𝑖) = ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑏𝑏𝑗=𝑡(𝑖−1)
𝑗=𝑡(0) +
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∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑏𝑎𝑗=𝑡(𝑖−1)
𝑗=𝑡(0)   and 𝑀_𝐿
𝑡(𝑖)+𝑤 = ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑏𝑏𝑗=𝑡(𝑖)+𝑤
𝑗=𝑡(0) + ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑏𝑎𝑗=𝑡(𝑖)+𝑤
𝑗=𝑡(0)  , where t(i) is the time 
the ith limit order entering the market and t(0) = 21:00:00 GMT.6  
 
In the second model (Equation 2), the dependent variable is the change in the net limit 
order book (NLOB) within a specified time window (w), where w = 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 5, 
10 or 60 seconds following a new limit order submission (𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑖) – but excluding the 
limit order submission itself. The net limit order book is defined as the total amount 
of outstanding limit buy orders (Ab) and sell orders (Aa) in the order book. Hence,  
𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑡(𝑖) = ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑏𝑗=𝑡(𝑖−1)
𝑗=𝑡(0) + ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑎𝑗=𝑡(𝑖−1)
𝑗=𝑡(0)  and 𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐵
𝑡(𝑖)+𝑤 = ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑏𝑗=𝑡(𝑖)+𝑤
𝑗=𝑡(0) +
∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑎𝑗=𝑡(𝑖)+𝑤
𝑗=𝑡(0) . Thus, the change in the net limit order book for each time window 
captures both limit order cancellations and new limit order submissions after each 
new limit order submission.7 
 
A range of factors might affect the liquidity withdrawal process. Some henceforth 
referred to as ‘market-specific’ variables relate to the market in which the orders are 
submitted and not (directly) related to the limit order submissions themselves. The 
other group, which we refer to as ‘order-specific’ variables, are included to capture 
the specific characteristics of the new limit order submissions (and more related to 
strategic trading), which might have an impact on the liquidity of the market. 
 
4.2 Market-specific variables 
 
As a proxy for market activity, where 𝑀_𝐴𝑖 = ∑ 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑗
𝑗=𝑡(𝑖)
𝑗=𝑡(𝑖)−60𝑠 , we use the number of 
limit order submissions submitted to the EBS platform in the respective currency pair 
during the previous 60 seconds.  
 
                                                        
6 For instance, if the best bid-ask spread consists of 3 million buy orders and 5 million sell orders 
immediately before a new limit order submission the market liquidity is 8 million. If, 1 second after the 
limit order has been submitted, the best-bid ask spread contains 4 million buy orders and 5 million sell 
orders, the change in the market liquidity is  +1 million.  
7 For instance, if the limit order book consists of 25 million buy orders and 10 million sell orders at the 
time of a new limit order submission the net limit order book is 35 million. If 1 second after the limit 
order has been submitted, the limit order book (excluding the new limit order submission) consists of 
22 million buy orders and 8 million sell orders, the change in the net limit order book is –5 million. 
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The liquidity withdrawal process might also be affected by the prevailing liquidity of 
the market, 𝑀_𝐿𝑡(𝑖). 
 
Given the short time windows used in our estimation, we also apply a very short-term 
measure of volatility. Hence, volatility is measured using the mid-market price of the 
best limit buy and sell orders (pbm) at each second during a 60-second interval prior to 
the new limit order submission, i.e. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 = √252 × 24 × 60 × 𝜎(∑ ((𝑝𝑗−1𝑠
𝑏𝑚𝑗=𝑡(𝑖)−1𝑠
𝑗=𝑡(𝑖)−61𝑠 /
𝑝𝑗−2𝑠
𝑏𝑚 ) − 1), where 𝜎 is the variance.  
 
Moreover, the liquidity withdrawal process could be dependent on the prevailing bid-
ask spread, i.e. the difference between the best ask and bid prices, (𝑝𝑡(𝑖−1)
𝑏𝑎 − 𝑝𝑡(𝑖−1)
𝑏𝑏 ) 
measured vis-à-vis the mid price, 𝑝𝑡(𝑖−1)
𝑏𝑚 , on the EBS platform immediately prior to 
the limit order submission. Thus, 𝐵_𝐴𝑖 = (𝑝𝑡(𝑖−1)
𝑏𝑎 − 𝑝𝑡(𝑖−1)
𝑏𝑏 )/𝑝𝑡(𝑖−1)
𝑏𝑚 .  
 
4.3 Order-specific variables 
 
We also include order-specific independent variables to capture the strategic 
behaviour of traders submitting and cancelling limit orders – and the immediate 
reaction to these by others. For instance, an order could be perceived to be 
particularly relevant to the market if it improves or matches the current best bid-ask 
spread. In the models, we, therefore, include dummy variables for orders that are 
moderately aggressive, aggressive or very aggressive, and would expect the reaction 
to these to be stronger. We use the following scale: 
 
VAggi  (Very aggressive) = if the new limit order submission price 𝑝𝑖 improves 
the best bid-ask spread. 
Aggi  (Aggressive) = if the new limit order submission price 𝑝𝑖 matches the 
best bid-ask spread. 
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MAggi  (Moderately aggressive) = if the new limit order submission price 𝑝𝑖 is 
outside, but within 2 pips (200 pips for EUR/SEK, EUR/NOK and 
USD/MXN)8 of the best bid-ask spread. 
 
For EUR/USD, USD/JPY, EUR/JPY, USD/MXN and USD/RUB, we use a set of 
extra dummy variables. According to Lo and Sapp (2010), traders not only consider 
price aggressiveness when submitting limit orders but also the amount. Anecdotal 
evidence from traders strongly suggests that large orders are more likely to influence 
the market price (and hence more likely to trigger order cancellations) than small 
orders. Although our dataset contains some very large limit orders indeed, the 
overwhelming majority of is for precisely the minimum amount allowed on the 
electronic platform, namely $1 million or €1 million (see Table 3).  
 
< Table 3: Limit order amounts and split orders > 
 
In fact, the proportion of minimum orders for EUR/SEK, EUR/NOK and USD/TRY 
is close to 100% (which is why we do not include the dummy variables below for 
these currencies). A notable exception is the USD/RUB market, where larger orders 
are the norm, rather than the exception. To capture the potential impact of large 
orders, we include a dummy variable. 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖 is a dummy variable for order amounts 
larger than ($ or €) 1 million. A large limit order is more likely to influence the 
market price and the outstanding volume at the best bid-ask spread and in the limit 
order book as a whole.  
 
However, precisely for this reason, as a result of the anticipated market reaction 
following a large order submission, a well-established trading strategy is that of order-
splitting. Assuming that other traders, perhaps instinctively, react more and faster to 
incoming large limit orders, a string of relatively small order submissions could act to 
disguise the ‘true’ order size and hence trigger a more muted market reaction. 
Algorithmic traders have a much greater ability than human traders to split large 
orders into many small orders. As a consequence, a high number and proportion of 
                                                        
8 To account for market conventions and differences in currency values, we denote 1 pip as the 4th 
decimal for EUR/USD, EUR/SEK, EUR/NOK, USD/MXN and USD/TRY and as the 2nd decimal for 
USD/JPY, EUR/JPY and USD/RUB. 
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very small orders are often observed in financial markets where high-frequency 
traders are prominent. In our model, a split limit order, 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖, is a dummy variable. In 
our models, all of the following four criteria need to hold for a submission to be 
counted as a split order. First, the price of limit order submission, 𝑝𝑡(𝑖), is the same as 
the price of limit order, 𝑝𝑡(𝑗), where j ≠ i and j > i. Second, the direction of limit order 
submission i (i.e. bid or ask) is the same as the direction of limit order submission j. 
Third, limit order i and  j are submitted within less than 0.1 seconds (t(j) - t(i) < 0.1). 
Fourth, no other orders are submitted or cancelled in between the submissions of limit 
order i and j.9 If an order-splitting strategy is ‘detected’ by other traders, the impact 
should be similar to that of a large order. If, however, such tactics are successfully 
used to conceal the ‘true’ (larger) order size, it should have no additional influence on 
the market liquidity. 
 
Furthermore, Lo and Sapp (2010) find evidence of a trade-off between size and 
aggressiveness among orders submitted by traders in the FX spot market for US 
dollars against Deutschmarks and Canadian dollars in 1997 – an observation which is 
also strongly supported by market participants. To be able to account for these factors, 
we use a set of cross dummy variables for large orders that moderately aggressive, 
aggressive or very aggressive. 
 
4.4 Estimation and diagnostics 
 
We run 112 regressions using OLS (eight currency pairs, seven time windows and 
two equations).10 After checking the diagnostic results of the residuals, we found 
heteroskedastic behaviour. Thus, we use the Huber-White covariance matrix. To 
                                                        
9 The differences in market structure (the FX market has much fewer currency pairs than, say, the 
equity market has stocks) allow us to adopt a stricter classification of a split order than Yeo (2005). 
Moreover, as our dataset contains anonymous trader IDs, we believe a very conservative proxy is 
appropriate to avoid overcounting. Naturally, orders submitted within more than 0.1 seconds of each 
other or at different prices might still be part of an order-splitting strategy. However, given that our 
methodology already results in around 15–25% of all orders being classified as split limit orders for the 
major currency pairs, we do not believe a less conservative measure is necessary. For instance, using 
0.2 rather than 0.1 seconds only increases the proportion of split orders in the EUR/JPY market from 
25.25% to 26.40% and in the USD/RUB market from 1.77% to 2.05%. Having conducted robustness 
checks by running regressions with this more flexible measure, we do not find any significant 
differences in the results.  
10 Because the dependent variable is not limited (our data is neither censored nor truncated), we do not 
use TOBIT.  
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check for multicollinearity, we calculate correlations among the independent variables. 
We do not, however, find any high correlations.  
 
As our dataset starts on a Friday and ends on a Tuesday, it excludes the weekend 
when no trading takes place. However, we do not conduct a time-series analysis 
because we use uneven spaced data. Instead, we study pre-defined time windows with 
different starting points (the time stamp of a new limit order submission to the order 
book).11 The weekend is therefore not problematic. As a robustness check, however, 
we run the 336 necessary regressions (8 currency pairs, seven time windows, two 
equations, three trading days independently). The results from the individual trading 
days are almost the same as for the period combined. As another robustness check, we 
run separate tests where we exclude the first 50 and 100 observations from the raw 
dataset. We do not, however, find any significant differences.  
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for each independent variable used in the 
regressions.  
 
< Table 4: Descriptive statistics > 
 
As can be seen, the market activity is very high for the major currency pairs. Each 
new limit order submission in the EUR/USD market is preceded by an average of 
613.1 limit order submissions during the previous 60 seconds. The corresponding 
                                                        
11 It could be argued that our models contain an overlapping issue. Suppose a limit order submission at 
precisely 21:00:00 triggers a change in the net limit order book by –3 million within 0.5 seconds. The 
difference could, in fact, stem from any limit order submission after 21:00:00 but before 21:00:05. The 
longer the time window, the higher the probability of a stronger impact of other orders. Likewise, the 
higher the market activity, the higher the likelihood of overlapping. To partly offset this issue, we 
include market activity (the number of limit order submissions during the previous 60 seconds) as an 
independent variable. Importantly, though, we do not try to quantify and analyse each limit order 
submission and its induced liquidity impact in our paper. Instead, we calculate the change in the market 
liquidity within pre-specified time windows following each new limit order submission to the limit 
order book – and then analyse the results through the lens of the specific characteristics of that limit 
order and the state of the market at the time of submission.  
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numbers for USD/JPY and EUR/JPY are 332.6 and 231.2 respectively. The average 
bid-ask spread is exceptionally tight for EUR/USD (0.0083%) and USD/JPY 
(0.0134%). To put this into perspective, assume the best prices in these markets were 
1.2643–1.2644 and 83.49–83.50 respectively. These prices would correspond to bid-
ask spreads of 0.0079% and 0.0120%. Despite market activity being higher for 
EUR/JPY, the bid-ask spread is somewhat wider (0.0213%) – most likely because it is 
an FX cross. 12 Given that volatility is based upon price movements during the 60-
second time window before each new limit order submission, the average volatility is 
very low (EUR/USD: 0.0170%, USD/JPY: 0.0174% and EUR/JPY: 0.0226%). In 
fact, the same can be said about all eight currency pairs in our study, which captures a 
period of relative stability in the market. The market liquidity for EUR/USD and 
USD/JPY are relatively similar. An average of €16.2 million and $17.1 million 
respectively is posted at the current best bid-ask spread at the time of each new limit 
order submission. Consistent with being an FX cross, the EUR/JPY market is 
somewhat less deep (€6.7 million). The major currency pairs also display a fairly 
similar distribution regarding the dummy variables linked to price aggressiveness and 
order size, as well as order-splitting strategies.  
 
The market activity for EUR/SEK (31.6) and EUR/NOK (29.9) are considerably 
lower than for the major currency pairs. This is more or less in line with the total 
number of limit order submissions and limit order volume during the studied trading 
days, as well as the statistics from the BIS (2013). The bid-ask spreads are also 
significantly wider (EUR/SEK: 0.1327%, EUR/NOK: 0.1621%) than for any other 
currency pairs in our study.13 With regards to the market liquidity, the Scandinavian 
currency pairs are also the thinnest in the study, with an average market liquidity of 
€1.9 million for both. After all, almost 100% of limit order submissions are for the 
minimum allowed size on the electronic trading platform, namely €1 (or $1) million. 
A very high proportion (around 60%) of the limit orders are classified as moderately 
aggressive and most of the remaining as either aggressive or very aggressive. 
 
                                                        
12 Most FX cross rates reflect the higher transaction costs associated with having to deal at two, rather 
than one, bid-ask spread.  
13 Note that EUR/SEK and EUR/NOK, rather than USD/SEK and USD/NOK, are the currency pairs 
traditionally quoted in the FX interbank spot market. 
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The descriptive statistics paint a highly diverse picture when it comes to the three 
emerging market currencies. The market activity for USD/MXN is considerably 
higher (131.6) than other indicators for turnover might suggest (such as data provided 
by BIS). In this respect, the corresponding number for USD/RUB, however, is lower 
(25.9) and USD/TRY somewhat higher (44.2). All three currency pairs are placed 
somewhere in the middle of the range with regards to the bid-ask spread (with an 
average of 0.0694%, 0.0514% and 0.0559% respectively). Interestingly, however, the 
median bid-ask spread for USD/RUB is tight (0.0326%). This suggests that the 
market, despite having a fairly low market activity, appears to be remarkably 
competitive. Strikingly, the market liquidity (proxied by the volume at the best bid-
ask spread) in the USD/RUB market (15.3) is almost on par with that in the 
EUR/USD and USD/JPY markets. The fact that the Russian ruble market is an outlier, 
in this case, is undoubtedly a result of the extremely high proportion of large order 
submissions (see Table 3). The market liquidity for USD/MXN and USD/TRY ($2.6 
and $2.2 million respectively) are relatively similar to the Scandinavian currencies. 
The emerging market currency pairs also display significant differences regarding 
price aggressiveness. For instance, whereas only 12.9% of limit order submissions in 
the Turkish lira market are classified as moderately aggressive, the figure for the 
Mexican peso is by far the highest in our study: 69.8%. 
 
5.2 Major currencies  
 
With regards to the market-specific variables, the results for the major currency pairs 
are relatively similar (see Tables 5–7).  
 
< Table 5: Change in EUR/USD market liquidity (mio) and EUR/USD net limit order 
book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 1,419,630) > 
 
< Table 6: Change in USD/JPY market liquidity (mio) and USD/JPY net limit order 
book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 787,213) > 
 
< Table 7: Change in EUR/JPY market liquidity (mio) and EUR/JPY net limit order 
book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 751,239) > 
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Higher market activity triggers a more liquid market at the best bid-ask spread. The 
sign is positive and strongly significant for all currency pairs and all time windows. 
This pattern is consistent with Hartmann (1998), who shows that trading volume 
contributes to better price-based liquidity in the long run. Whereas higher market 
activity consistently increases the net limit order book for EUR/USD, the results are 
mixed for USD/JPY and EUR/JPY depending on which time window is applied. 
Interestingly, the current market liquidity at the time of each new limit order 
submission is a negative predictor of the future market liquidity and the net limit 
order book in 41 out of the 42 regressions involving the major currency pairs. 
 
EUR/USD, USD/JPY and EUR/JPY have extremely tight bid-ask spreads. However, 
the markets, in terms of volume-based liquidity at the best price, are also susceptible 
to wider spreads in the short-run. The coefficients are large and a wider spread has an 
immediate negative impact on market liquidity. These findings are consistent with the 
literature showing that higher volatility tends to be associated with wider bid-ask 
spreads (Bassembinder, 1994; Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994; Glassman, 1987; 
Hartmann, 1998; Hua and Li, 2011). Thus, a relatively wide bid-ask spread might 
indicate uncertainty in the market, having a similar effect on the volume at the current 
spread (Foucault et al., 2007). 
 
At the same time, however, wider bid-ask spreads consistently have a positive impact 
on the net limit order book for the major currency pairs. For instance, an increase in 
the spread of just one pip (approximately 0.0079%) in the EUR/USD market reduces 
the volume submitted at the best bid-ask spread by €1.56 million within 0.5 seconds. 
However, the net limit order book is increased by €3.86 million.14 All major currency 
pairs display similar results, suggesting that a wider bid-ask spread is associated with 
a visibly thinner and more uncertain market. This, however, prompts traders to be 
more active, yet defensive, in their limit order submission strategies – consistent with 
the notion that a wider spread might tempt traders to supply liquidity to the market as 
a whole (Lo and Sapp, 2010). 
 
                                                        
14 The 0.5-second coefficients for the bid-ask spread in Table 5 are –197.408 and 488.201. 
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Short-term volatility also has a negative impact on market liquidity and the net limit 
order book. However, the effect is statistically much less robust than the bid-ask 
spread. These results are, perhaps, not surprising given the stable market conditions 
during our period of study. The only exception is the change in the net limit order 
book for EUR/JPY, where it is positive and strongly significant for longer time 
windows. Moreover, it could be argued that higher short-term volatility could have 
both a positive and negative influence on the liquidity withdrawal process. On the one 
hand, limit orders are more likely to be executed if the volatile picks up (which could 
prompt traders to the leave their orders in the book in the hope of being filled). On the 
other hand, volatility could signal that new information has arrived in the market 
(which would prompt traders to cancel their orders in order not to be picked off). 
 
Turning to the order-specific variables, a limit order submitted at a relatively 
aggressive price should trigger a reaction by other traders for two reasons. First, a 
relatively aggressive buy [sell] order should trigger some traders with sell [buy] 
orders to cancel their orders and, in anticipation of an advantageous market price 
move, resubmit them at a higher [lower] price. Second, a relatively aggressive buy 
[sell] order should trigger some traders with buy [sell] orders to cancel their orders 
and, in anticipation of a disadvantageous market price move, resubmit them at a 
higher [lower] price. The empirical results show that very aggressive, aggressive and 
moderately aggressive limit order submissions have a positive impact on the liquidity 
of the EUR/USD FX spot market. For USD/JPY and EUR/JPY, only (very) 
aggressive and very aggressive orders, respectively, trigger a similar pattern. The 
impact on the net limit order book is more mixed, and thus, when seen in isolation, 
the aggressiveness dummies are hardly illuminating. 
 
The results for split orders and large orders are more revealing. Large orders are more 
likely to influence the market price and hence the liquidity submission/withdrawal of 
other traders. Therefore, it is well established that algorithmic traders often resort to 
order-splitting strategies to disguise their ‘true’ size. As our dataset contains 
anonymous trader IDs, we are unable to distinguish between human and algorithmic 
traders. However, psychologists estimate that it takes approximately 0.1–0.4 seconds 
for a human to blink. 15–25% of limit orders in the major currency pairs are classified 
as split orders, despite using a strict definition (see Section 4.3). We can therefore 
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safely assume that the vast majority, if not all, of the split orders, are submitted by 
non-human traders. Algorithmic traders might also submit large orders. However, 
human traders should be considerably more prevalent, if not dominant, in the latter 
category. As Tables 5–7 show, split orders consistently add liquidity to the market for 
the major currency pairs. They also tend to have a positive net influence on the net 
limit order book. However, the impact is very short-lived, and split orders have a 
detrimental effect on the net limit order book in the EUR/USD, USD/JPY and 
EUR/JPY markets when longer time windows are used. The impact of large orders is 
different. Whereas large and moderately aggressive limit orders have a positive 
impact on the market liquidity, large and very aggressive orders have a negative 
impact. Strikingly, however, for all major currency pairs, large orders (regardless 
whether they are classified as very aggressive, aggressive or moderately aggressive) 
have a positive impact on the net limit order book.  
 
Put together; these results lend support to the literature pointing to the increasing 
prevalence of split orders in the stock market. Order-splitting strategies in the 
EUR/USD, USD/JPY and EUR/JPY FX spot markets appear to ‘successfully’ avoid 
causing immediate liquidity withdrawal at the current best bid-ask spread. 
Nonetheless, the impact of such algorithmic trading strategies on the net limit order 
book could be detrimental for some currency pairs. It appears as if high-frequency 
traders contribute to additional volume-based liquidity provision by others. However, 
this incremental contribution is exceptionally short-lived. By the time human traders 
plausibly had had the time to react (perhaps after 1 second or more), the liquidity 
contribution has disappeared or has become negative. By contrast, the empirical 
results suggest that large limit orders (which, arguably, are much more associated 
with human traders) have a positive influence on the net limit order book once 
algorithmic traders have reacted. Limit order submissions larger than the $1 million 
minimum result in additional contributions by others.  
 
5.3 Scandinavian currencies  
 
Despite having considerably wider bid-ask spreads than the major currency pairs, the 
market liquidity for EUR/SEK and EUR/NOK is negatively affected by a widening of 
the spread. However, the impact is the opposite when studying the limit order book as 
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a whole. Moreover, even though the volatility is low for both during the trading days 
studied, the regressions show a clear positive relationship. Traders tend to withdraw 
liquidity from the limit order book as price volatility increases, which is connected to 
a change in information asymmetry among market participants (Foucault, 1999; 
Foucault et al., 2005). In sum, EUR/SEK and EUR/NOK traders (human or 
algorithmic) appear to be highly sensitive to busy markets – and react to even 
minuscule price movements by cancelling their limit orders. Importantly for the 
discussion below, however, market activity is a positive predictor (up to 10 seconds) 
of the change in the net limit order book (see Tables 8 and 9).  
 
< Table 8: Change in EUR/SEK market liquidity (mio) and EUR/SEK net limit order 
book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 47,473) > 
 
< Table 9: Change in EUR/NOK market liquidity (mio) and EUR/NOK net limit 
order book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 36,063) > 
 
Given that the Scandinavian currency markets are much thinner, one could argue that 
relatively aggressive orders might have a positive impact on the market liquidity - as 
it would be more likely that they added to the volume at the best bid-ask spread or, 
perhaps, prompted other traders to submit orders at matching prices. However, as the 
results in Tables 8 and 9 show, the sign of the aggressiveness dummies tends to be 
negative or insignificant, rather than positive. Moreover, regarding the impact on the 
net limit order book, aggressive or moderately aggressive orders are consistently 
associated with liquidity withdrawal for EUR/SEK and EUR/NOK (for all time 
windows). Notably, EUR/SEK and EUR/NOK have by far the highest proportions of 
limit order submissions classified as moderately aggressive (63.0% and 58.5%). Why 
would these, then, typically trigger short-term liquidity withdrawal when studying the 
net limit order book? One answer probably lies in the market microstructure of these 
currencies on EBS. In contrast to the major currency pairs, the leading electronic 
trading platform for EUR/SEK and EUR/NOK is Reuters 3000 Xtra. Being a 
‘secondary platform’, the prices for these currency pairs on EBS are seen as less 
competitive. Indeed, a closer inspection reveals that a large number of limit orders, 
especially when the market is thin and quiet, are cancelled and resubmitted at 
marginally more competitive prices in quick succession. This process is often halted 
 23 
when a limit order on the other side of the other book is cancelled. Such trading 
strategies, involving orders submitted, cancelled and resubmitted at gradually (or in 
the case of algorithmic traders: extremely quickly) could either be adopted to “tease” 
a trader on the other side of the order book to switch from a limit order to a market 
order, or to “take the pulse of the market” by exposing the price level at which limit 
orders are cancelled by others on EBS. 
 
5.4 Emerging market currencies 
 
It is important to note that the number of currencies classified as emerging markets is 
substantial and diverse. Therefore, any conclusions drawn from this category have to 
be put into that perspective. However, as our study covers three of the largest ones, 
which have outstripped several G10 currencies regarding daily turnover in recent 
years, the question is whether the short-term liquidity withdrawal process bears 
resemblance with one the two categories above, or whether it has some distinct 
features. 
 
Tables 1 and 3 show how comparable the Turkish lira and the Scandinavian 
currencies are regarding size, turnover and market activity. However, with regards to 
the liquidity withdrawal process, they are very different (see Table 10).  
 
< Table 10: Change in USD/TRY market liquidity (mio) and USD/TRY net limit 
order book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 38,499) > 
 
USD/TRY is the only currency pair in our study where higher volatility and a wider 
bid-ask spread consistently predicts liquidity withdrawal – both regarding the market 
liquidity at the best bid-ask spread and the net limit order book. Put differently; 
liquidity has a tendency to be withdrawn when uncertainty is high. Moreover, the 
Turkish lira market is also highly susceptible to relatively aggressive limit order 
submissions. However, in contrast to the Scandinavian currency pairs, all categories 
of aggressiveness have a positive, rather than negative, influence of the net limit order 
book.  
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Theoretically, better market liquidity ought to trigger more limit order cancellations 
and limit order submissions for two reasons. First, an increase in the liquidity on the 
same side of the market should trigger competing traders to cancel and resubmit their 
orders at more competitive price levels (Biais et al., 1985; Hall and Hautsch, 2006, 
2007). Second, an increase in the liquidity on the opposite side of the market should 
increase the likelihood that traders cancel and resubmit their orders at a different price 
due to the expected change in the cost of transacting (Goettler et al., 2005; Lo and 
Sapp, 2010). The net impact in the short-term is, however, unclear. Interestingly, 
USD/MXN is the only market in our study where market liquidity consistently has a 
positive effect on the net limit order book (Table 11).  
 
< Table 11: Change in USD/MXN market liquidity (mio) and USD/MXN net limit 
order book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 127,833) > 
 
What is more, in contrast to the major currency pairs, higher market activity in the 
USD/MXN market leads to liquidity withdrawal at the current best bid-ask spread 
(but to liquidity provision to the order book as a whole). Indeed, several studies show 
that price-based liquidity tends to deteriorate in line with trading activity, order size 
and quoting frequency (Bollerslev and Domowitz, 1993; Glassman, 1987; Lyons, 
1995; Melvin and Yin, 2000). Put differently; higher market activity could indicate 
greater uncertainty – prompting traders to revise and submit less aggressive limit 
orders to the market. In this respect, the results for USD/MXN seem consistent with 
the existing microstructure literature on price-based liquidity. 
 
The USD/MXN dataset consists of approximately 25% large orders. Large orders 
classified as very aggressive or moderately aggressive contribute to more liquidity at 
the current best bid-ask spread. However, aggressive orders do not. Nonetheless, all 
large orders (regardless whether they are classified as either very aggressive, 
aggressive or moderately aggressive) have a positive, and substantial, impact on the 
net limit order book in the Mexican peso market. For instance, a new large order 
submission improving the best bid-ask spread triggers an additional $1.456 million 
worth of limit orders within 0.1 seconds. Whereas these results are even more 
consistent than for the major currency pairs, the results for split orders are 
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insignificant (which could be due to the low number of USD/MXN split-order 
observations). 
 
For the Russian ruble, it is the order-specific variables that stand out (see Table 12).  
 
< Table 12: Change in USD/RUB market liquidity (mio) and USD/RUB net limit 
order book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 31,778) > 
 
Any combination of a large and aggressive order triggers substantial liquidity 
withdrawal from the limit order book. For instance, a new large order submission (yet 
only classified as moderately aggressive) triggers removal of $7.101 million from the 
limit order book within 0.5 seconds. Interestingly, split orders submitted to disguise a 
large order amount trigger a significant increase in the net limit order book. Thus, the 
relatively infrequently deployed order-splitting strategies in the USD/RUB market 
appear to go undetected and contribute to the market liquidity, whereas the dominant 
strategy involving large order submission tends to result in order cancellation by 
others.  
 
The market-specific variables may shed some light on this. Uniquely for the currency 
pairs in our study, a wider bid-ask spread and higher volatility overwhelmingly result 
in short-term liquidity provision, rather than liquidity withdrawal in the USD/RUB 
market. Thus, the predictors of liquidity withdrawal in the Russian ruble market are 
entirely different. It appears as if a thin and illiquid market prompts traders to submit 
new limit orders at increasingly aggressive prices. However, the combination of large 
and aggressive prices triggers a substantial decrease in the net limit order book, which 
includes orders submitted behind the best bid-ask spread.  
 
5.5 The dependent variables 
 
As the change in the market liquidity is calculated from the time of each limit order 
submission, we might expect the dependent variable to be positive as we disregard 
any time periods where there is no market activity whatsoever - such as during the 
weekend or the Asian time zone for the Scandinavian currencies. Moreover, even 
though the major currency pairs are traded around-the-clock, some hours or minutes 
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are busier than others. For instance, the median market activity (i.e. the number of 
limit order submissions 60 seconds before each new submission) for EUR/USD and 
USD/JPY is 513 and 263. However, the maximum is 4,479 and 2,050 respectively. 
Therefore, the change in the market liquidity should have a positive bias at the outset.  
 
The mean dependent variable for the change in the market liquidity is, indeed, 
positive and gradually increasing for the currency pairs, which are relatively deep 
(EUR/USD, USD/JPY, EUR/JPY and USD/RUB). The thinner currency pairs do not 
display the same pattern. Whereas the mean dependent variable for USD/TRY is 
marginally positive, EUR/SEK, EUR/NOK and USD/MXN are negative. Since we 
exclude the limit order submission from the calculation of the net change of the limit 
order book, the mean dependent variable should also, at the outset, be positive (using 
the logic above). Indeed, the mean dependent variable is positive and gradually 
increasing for EUR/SEK, EUR/NOK, EUR/TRY, USD/MXN and USD/RUB. 
However, there are significant differences. Whereas a new EUR/SEK limit order 
submission is, on average, followed by a liquidity provision of €0.235, €0.473 and 
€0.945 million with 0.1, 1 and 60 seconds respectively, the corresponding amounts in 
the USD/RUB market are $3.384, $8.870 and $12.825 million.  
 
Remarkably, the three major currency pairs, which have seen the most significant 
influx of algorithmic traders, display an entirely different pattern. For EUR/USD, the 
net change of limit order book is only positive when using a time window of 0.1 
seconds. After that, a new limit order submission is associated with liquidity 
withdrawal from the market as a whole. The sharpest fall drop in liquidity occurs 
between 0.2 and 0.5 seconds, and after 1 second, €2.047 million have already been 
withdrawn from the market (note that the average order size is €1.28 million in the 
EUR/USD market). After that, the order book gradually displays signs of recovery, 
although the net impact remains negative even after 60 seconds. The results for the 
world’s second-largest currency pair (USD/JPY) are almost identical. The liquidity 
withdrawal process is at its most extreme between 0.2 and 0.5 seconds, and after 1 
second, a new limit order submission has resulted in a net withdrawal of $1.968 
million from the order book. The impact is still negative after 10 seconds, but the 
order book has recovered after 60 seconds. EUR/JPY displays a similar, yet more 
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muted pattern. Here, the short-term liquidity withdrawal process lasts less than 5 
seconds. 
 
To sum up, a new limit order submission does immediately trigger more contributions 
to the EUR/USD, USD/JPY and EUR/JPY limit order books. However, this positive 
impact disappears after 100–200 milliseconds. When human traders have had the 
opportunity to react to the new information contained in the limit order submission, 
the limit order book is already smaller than it was before. This finding lends support 
to the anecdotal evidence by numerous market participants in the FX spot market 
arguing that “the market disappears when you try to deal” (although hitherto not yet 
confirmed in the academic literature). Our results support claims that a ‘liquidity 
illusion’ might exist in the electronic FX spot market – at least for major currency 
pairs. 
 
 
 
6. Concluding discussion 
 
In this paper, we have conducted an empirical investigation into market-specific and 
order-specific drivers of liquidity withdrawal in the FX spot market for eight currency 
pairs under stable market conditions. Using different time windows ranging from 0.1 
seconds to 1 minute to capture the increasing prominence of algorithms on electronic 
trading platforms such as EBS, our key findings can be summarised as follows. 
 
First, the FX spot markets react very differently to changes in the state of the market. 
Whereas a wider bid-ask spread triggers traders to provide liquidity to limit order 
book for seven currency pairs in our study, it results in liquidity withdrawal in the 
USD/TRY market. Moreover, higher short-term volatility is generally associated with 
liquidity withdrawal. Interestingly, however, uncertainty can also serve to predict 
liquidity provision, rather than withdrawal – as evidenced by results from the 
USD/RUB and USD/MXN markets. 
 
Second, the liquidity withdrawal process depends on the perceived information 
content of new limit orders submitted to the market. For instance, relatively 
aggressive limit orders trigger a change in the liquidity. However, the impact is 
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positive for the Turkish lira and negative for the Scandinavian currency pairs. 
Moreover, the large and relatively aggressive orders have a strongly positive impact 
on the net limit order book for USD/MXN, but a strongly negative impact on 
USD/RUB. The effect of large orders is different for the EUR/USD, USD/JPY and 
EUR/JPY. Large and relatively aggressive limit orders often serve as predictors of 
liquidity withdrawal from the limit order book in the short run. However, when 
studying longer time windows, they have a positive impact on the net limit order 
book. 
 
Third, order-splitting strategies (typically adopted by algorithmic traders to disguise 
their actual size) appear to ‘successfully’ avoid causing immediate liquidity 
withdrawal at the current best bid-ask spread. They also tend to have a positive net 
influence on the net limit order book (particularly for USD/RUB). However, when 
using slightly longer time windows, the impact is either not significant or, in the case 
of EUR/USD, USD/JPY and EUR/JPY, where split orders are very common, 
detrimental. 
 
Fourth, the results support claims that a ‘liquidity illusion’ might exist in the 
electronic FX spot market – at least for major currency pairs. New limit order 
submissions trigger more contributions to the EUR/USD, USD/JPY and EUR/JPY 
limit order books. However, this impact disappears after 0.1–0.2 seconds (“before a 
human has had the time to blink”), and then turns negative. Put differently, when 
human traders, plausibly, have had the opportunity to react to the new information 
contained in the limit order submission, algorithms have already responded by having 
withdrawn liquidity from the market.  
 
Overall, this cross-country study has shown that market participants react differently 
to both market-specific and order-specific factors regarding liquidity provision and 
withdrawal. Whereas the results show strong similarities within the category 
consisting of the major currencies (EUR/USD, USD/JPY and EUR/JPY), as well as 
the Scandinavian currencies (EUR/SEK and EUR/NOK), they are very different from 
each other. The group of emerging market currencies (USD/MXN, USD/RUB and 
USD/TRY) stands out by being uniquely diverse. From a theoretical perspective, this 
is surprising. After all, we have investigated traders using the same electronic trading 
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platform during a short period when the FX markets were relatively stable. The 
results seem to demonstrate that liquidity withdrawal is highly dependent on the 
unique market microstructure of the individual currency pairs or groups of currency 
pairs. These nuances suggest that a thorough understanding of FX market liquidity 
requires a more detailed examination that goes beyond traditional indicators such as 
turnover, volatility and the bid-ask spread. The provision and withdrawal of liquidity 
increasingly appears to be closely connected to other factors, such as the proportion of 
high-frequency traders (EUR/USD, USD/JPY and EUR/JPY), the choice of trading 
venue (EUR/SEK and EUR/NOK) or the conventional order size on the electronic 
platform (USD/RUB). Furthermore, the vastly different results for USD/MXN and 
USD/TRY (as well as USD/RUB) illustrate how multifaceted emerging markets are. 
These findings are important, particularly when bearing in mind that the FX market is 
decentralised and quote-driven. Historically, the market structure has been upheld by 
domestic and global banks quoting prices in a selection of currency pairs to customers 
upon request. To do so, market-making banks have relied on conventions to quote 
each other prices. Whereas some more formal liquidity provision obligations exist for 
some currency pairs (often with the endorsement of the respective central banks), the 
arrangements are primarily bilateral and informal (see Cheung and Wong, 2000; 
Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Stenfors, 2018). Indeed, ACI (The Financial Markets 
Association), which for over half a century has acted as the trade organisation for 
banks and central bank dealers in the FX and money markets around the world, still 
sees the informal market-making function by banks as logical and something that 
ought to be encouraged to maintain trust, reciprocity and liquidity in the marketplace 
(ACI, 2015). However, as the FX spot market for major (but also minor) currency 
pairs undergo a gradual migration to electronic trading platforms such as EBS and see 
a vast influx of algorithmic trading in the process, the traditional liquidity provision 
function traditionally performed by human traders is rapidly changing. This 
development could, on the one hand, be seen as long overdue and beneficial for the 
liquidity and the price discovery process in the world’s largest financial market. As 
Foucault et al. (2016) argue: directional high-frequency traders behave similarly to 
fast and informed speculators. If so, algorithmic traders would serve to enhance the 
price discovery process along the lines of Kyle (1985). There is no doubt that the 
eight FX spot markets in our study ‘appear’ to be very liquid under stable market 
conditions. More than 3 million limit orders, worth over $5 trillion in total, were 
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submitted to EBS during just three trading days. When distinguished simply 
according to their speed, algorithmic traders could be seen as having a positive 
influence on the quality of the FX spot market. However, being able to react faster, 
algorithmic traders have an advantage over traditional (human) market makers. The 
prevalence of what Harris (2013) refers to as ‘harmful’ high-frequency trading 
activities ultimately boil down to how algorithmic traders can ‘consume’ limit orders 
submitted by human traders who are not fast enough. Indeed, whether algorithmic 
traders ought to be regarded as liquidity providers or liquidity takers, the proportional 
decline in human limit order submissions and limit order cancellations is of more 
significant concern for OTC markets such as FX. Speed, in itself, might not be 
considered harmful to the marketplace. However, considerably faster machine-based 
reaction times could act to crowd out the human market making function traditionally 
provided by banks. As Huh (2014) points out, this might become problematic in 
markets where such traders dominate the market making function, as liquidity might 
disappear precisely when liquidity is needed the most. Given that algorithmic traders 
and high-frequency traders among them have no formal or informal market-making 
requirements, this could have severe consequences for banks, investors and central 
banks alike.  
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Table 1: Overview of the currency pairs and limit order submissions 
Currency pair  Low    High       Range LOS  Total limit order amount    Total market daily turnover  
EUR/USD 1.2643    1.2893     1.96% 1,419,630 €1,818,803,000,000   $494,040,648,978 
USD/JPY 83.49    84.50       1.20% 787,213 $1,020,022,000,000   $447,858,805,701 
EUR/JPY    105.965   107.94     1.85% 751,239 €897,039,000,000  $109,310,494,623 
EUR/SEK  9.1600    9.2540     1.02% 47,473  €52,839,000,000  $14,177,892,189 
EUR/NOK 7.8456    7.9159     0.89% 36,063  €41,331,000,000  $11,008,877,568 
USD/MXN     12.7645   13.0557   2.26% 127,833 $234,397,000,000   $54,169,517,444 
USD/RUB 30.64    30.97       1.07% 31,778  $212,680,000,000   $34,969,683,713 
USD/TRY     1.4866    1.5204     2.25% 38,499  $38,704,000,000   $13,931,439,112 
Sources: EBS, BIS (2013) and authors’ calculations. Notes: LOS = Limit order submissions, Market daily turnover = Daily average global 
turnover in the respective FX currency pair in April 2013 (in USD). ‘Low’ and ‘High’ denotes the lowest and highest mid-market price on 
EBS during 8-13 September 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
Table 2: Average number of limit order cancellations following each new limit order submission (time window in seconds) 
Currency pair    0.1  0.2  0.5   1  5  10  60 
EUR/USD   4.670   7.572   14.817    21.766   67.175   120.593 612.793  
USD/JPY   3.970   6.287   11.911   16.261   41.712   71.132   332.809  
EUR/JPY   1.967   3.265   6.729    10.090   31.896   57.993   303.815  
EUR/SEK   0.556   0.919   1.908    3.219   9.117   12.793   31.635  
EUR/NOK   0.496   0.813   1.665    2.765   7.468   10.423   29.722  
USD/MXN   1.403   1.760   4.177    6.297   18.073   30.634   131.704  
USD/RUB   0.138   0.247   0.539    0.865   2.868   5.146   25.412  
USD/TRY   0.895   1.142   1.900    2.635   7.229   11.905   44.015  
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3: Limit order amounts and split orders 
Currency pair   Minimum Maximum   Average Minimum (%) Split orders (%)  
EUR/USD     €1,000,000 €250,000,000  €1,281,181 86.50%  15.69% 
USD/JPY  $1,000,000 $250,000,000 $1,295,738 85.41%  20.44% 
EUR/JPY        €1,000,000 €100,000,000 €1,194,079 88.63%  25.25% 
EUR/SEK  €1,000,000 €1,000,000 €1,113,033 100.00% 0.00% 
EUR/NOK  €1,000,000 €2,000,000  €1,146,078 100.00% 0.00% 
USD/MXN      $1,000,000 $10,000,000 $1,833,619 74.50%  0.06% 
USD/RUB  $1,000,000 $49,000,000 $6,692,680 2.32%  1.77% 
USD/TRY      $1,000,000 $3,000,000 $1,005,325 99.97%  0.17% 
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations.  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
Independent variable  EUR/USD   USD/JPY    EUR/JPY   EUR/SEK     EUR/NOK  USD/MXN  USD/RUB   USD/TRY 
M_A   Mean   613.1         332.6    231.2           31.6       29.9            131.6            25.9             44.2 
   Median  513.0         263.0    166.0           23.0       20.0            112.0            24.0             29.0 
M_L  Mean   16.2         17.1    6.7           1.9       1.9              2.6        15.3              2.2 
  Median  13.0         14.0    6.0           2.0       2.0              2.0        15.0              2.0 
Vol  Mean   0.0170         0.0174    0.0226         0.0235       0.0361 0.0244         0.0181         0.0201 
  Median  0.0158         0.0162    0.0220         0.0072       0.0113 0.0149         0.0099         0.0156 
B_A  Mean   0.0083         0.0134    0.0213         0.1327       0.1621 0.0694         0.0514         0.0559 
   Median  0.0079         0.0119    0.0188         0.1211       0.1423 0.0585         0.0326         0.0465 
MAgg   Mean   37.39%         35.67%    41.56%        62.96%       58.45%       69.80%        53.94%        12.94% 
Agg  Mean   23.75%         33.48%    35.65%        17.70%       35.48%       18.25%        38.33%        37.76% 
VAgg  Mean   8.63%         4.22%    8.81%          15.43%       4.07%         10.67%        3.91%          3.93% 
Split  Mean   15.69%         20.44%    25.25%                0.06%          1.77%  
Large · MAgg Mean   5.24%         6.11%    5.72%                17.74%        24.90%  
Large · Agg Mean   2.05%         2.09%    0.39%                5.67%          23.72%  
Large · VAgg Mean   2.14%         1.42%    0.71%                2.47%          2.49%  
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. Notes: M_A = Market activity, M_L = Market liquidity (mio), Vol = 60-second volatility (%), B_A 
= Bid-ask spread (%), MAgg = Moderately aggressive limit order, Agg = Aggressive limit order, VAgg = Very aggressive limit order, Split 
= Split order, Large = Limit order > 1 mio. See Sections 4.1–4.3 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Table 5: Change in EUR/USD market liquidity (mio) and EUR/USD net limit order book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 1,419,630) 
 
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in market liquidity 0.672  0.993  1.061  1.319  1.183  1.234  1.123  
Constant   2.882** (0.023) 4.702** (0.030) 6.652** (0.034) 8.135** (0.037) 10.599** (0.035) 11.394** (0.035) 12.346** (0.031) 
M_A   0.001** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) 0.003** (<0.000) 0.003** (<0.000) 0.005** (<0.000) 0.006** (<0.000) 0.006** (<0.000) 
M_L   -0.153** (0.002) -0.240** (0.002) -0.373** (0.003) -0.435** (0.003) -0.682** (0.002) -0.745** (0.002) -0.846** (0.001) 
Vol   -0.010 (0.014) -0.003 (0.023) -0.021 (0.029) -0.020 (0.038) -0.056 (0.043) -0.069 (0.044) -0.098** (0.036) 
B_A   -93.163** (2.006) -166.891** (2.776) -197.408** (3.064) -256.987** (3.919) -241.777** (3.073) -230.479** (3.013) -161.288** (2.510) 
MAgg   0.089** (0.015) 0.175** (0.019) 0.141** (0.022) 0.082** (0.024) 0.091** (0.025) 0.094** (0.025) 0.066** (0.025) 
Agg   0.202** (0.017) 0.184** (0.021) 0.103** (0.025) 0.126** (0.026) 0.350** (0.028) 0.464** (0.029) 0.679** (0.029) 
VAgg   1.063** (0.027) 1.138** (0.032) 1.374** (0.037) 1.536** (0.040) 1.500** (0.042) 1.525** (0.043) 1.416** (0.043) 
Split   0.358** (0.017) 0.431** (0.021) 0.202** (0.024) 0.203** (0.025) 0.171** (0.027) 0.261** (0.027) 0.234** (0.027) 
Large · MAgg  0.105** (0.028) 0.234** (0.035) 0.441** (0.041) 0.497** (0.044) 0.865** (0.048) 0.928** (0.048) 0.975** (0.048) 
Large · Agg   0.280** (0.042) 0.414** (0.053) 0.249** (0.064) -0.077 (0.069) -0.154* (0.074) -0.112 (0.075) -0.121 (0.074) 
Large · VAgg  -0.108* (0.055) 0.196** (0.064) -0.020 (0.075) -0.364** (0.079) -0.790** (0.082) -1.033** (0.082) -1.139** (0.080) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.082  0.129  0.197  0.230  0.373  0.403  0.456  
          
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in net limit order book 0.209  -0.249  -1.899  -2.047  -1.618  -1.261  -0.507  
Constant   -0.330** (0.019) -1.034** (0.027) -3.375** (0.043) -3.717** (0.052) -2.795** (0.076) -2.228** (0.089) 1.426** (0.123) 
M_A   0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) 0.003** (<0.000) 0.004** (<0.000) 0.003** (<0.000) 
M_L   -0.057** (0.001) -0.118** (0.002) -0.234** (0.003) -0.285** (0.003) -0.486** (0.004) -0.561** (0.005) -0.752** (0.004) 
Vol   -0.063** (0.013) -0.121** (0.024) -0.249** (0.051) -0.305** (0.060) -0.361** (0.077) -0.359** (0.085) -0.029 (0.170) 
B_A   98.809** (1.787) 214.31** (2.699) 488.201** (4.563) 566.337** (5.644) 772.557** (7.971) 846.623** (8.860) 983.950** (10.32) 
MAgg   0.062** (0.013) 0.100** (0.017) -0.009 (0.023) -0.094** (0.028) -0.180** (0.043) -0.212** (0.052) -0.452** (0.080) 
Agg   0.350** (0.014) 0.719** (0.018) 0.979** (0.026) 1.118** (0.031) 1.571** (0.048) 1.762** (0.058) 1.608** (0.089) 
VAgg   0.514** (0.019) 1.098** (0.026) 1.352** (0.036) 1.433** (0.044) 1.608** (0.069) 1.722** (0.085) 1.350** (0.140) 
Split   0.762** (0.013) 0.598** (0.018) 0.069** (0.024) -0.039 (0.029) -0.044 (0.045) -0.064 (0.055) -0.420** (0.084) 
Large · MAgg  -0.001 (0.022) 0.184** (0.029) 0.937** (0.040) 1.165** (0.050) 1.707** (0.078) 1.872** (0.096) 1.957** (0.150) 
Large · Agg   -0.193** (0.034) 0.015 (0.045) 0.573** (0.060) 0.655** (0.078) 1.300** (0.121) 1.469** (0.146) 1.828** (0.230) 
Large · VAgg  -0.513** (0.034) 0.088 (0.047) 0.721** (0.066) 0.442** (0.080) 0.944** (0.135) 0.928** (0.166) 1.162** (0.268) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.022  0.048  0.102  0.096  0.099  0.087  0.064  
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. Notes: OLS, White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. */** denotes statistical significance at 95%/99% level. Standard errors in parentheses. M_A = Market 
activity, M_L = Market liquidity (mio), Vol = 60-second volatility (%), B_A = Bid-ask spread (%), MAgg = Moderately aggressive limit order, Agg = Aggressive limit order, VAgg = Very aggressive limit order, Split = Split 
order, Large = Limit order > 1 mio. See Sections 4.1–4.3 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Table 6: Change in USD/JPY market liquidity (mio) and USD/JPY net limit order book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 787,213) 
 
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in market liquidity 0.558  0.842  1.084  1.385  1.198  1.119  1.143  
Constant   3.031** (0.027) 5.006** (0.034) 7.423** (0.041) 9.215** (0.046) 12.269** (0.049) 13.182** (0.045) 15.048** (0.043) 
M_A   0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) 0.003** (<0.000) 0.003** (<0.000) 
M_L   -0.124** (0.002) -0.190** (0.003) -0.269** (0.004) -0.343** (0.005) -0.565** (0.004) -0.649** (0.004) -0.786** (0.003) 
Vol   -0.074 (0.106) 0.069 (0.157) 0.053 (0.241) -0.058 (0.286) -0.823* (0.389) -1.017* (0.418) -1.224** (0.407) 
B_A   -70.707** (1.968) -125.590** (2.576) -184.660** (3.210) -206.275** (3.714) -182.330** (3.761) -175.470** (3.156) -152.013** (2.588) 
MAgg   0.101** (0.020) 0.259** (0.025) 0.332** (0.030) 0.294** (0.031) 0.157** (0.035) 0.180** (0.036) 0.057 (0.036) 
Agg   0.428** (0.021) 0.513** (0.025) 0.282** (0.030) 0.388** (0.032) 0.581** (0.036) 0.732** (0.037) 0.851** (0.037) 
VAgg   1.990** (0.059) 1.786** (0.066) 2.494** (0.075) 2.719** (0.079) 2.182** (0.085) 1.795** (0.084) 0.990** (0.082) 
Split   0.617** (0.021) 0.723** (0.025) 0.532** (0.029) 0.580** (0.031) 0.543** (0.034) 0.476** (0.034) 0.409** (0.035) 
Large · MAgg  0.131** (0.034) 0.321** (0.042) 0.446** (0.049) 0.693** (0.052) 1.353** (0.059) 1.582** (0.059) 1.796** (0.060) 
Large · Agg   -0.424** (0.059) -0.562** (0.072) -0.313** (0.082) -0.477** (0.090) -0.558** (0.097) -0.356** (0.101) -0.527** (0.097) 
Large · VAgg  -0.874** (0.101) -0.690** (0.116) -1.435** (0.139) -1.069** (0.146) -1.324** (0.152) -1.355** (0.146) -1.194** (0.140) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.076    0.118    0.166    0.211    0.326    0.374    0.447   
               
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in net limit order book 0.225  -0.198  -1.824  -1.968  -1.403  -1.023  0.368  
Constant   0.085** (0.019) -0.589** (0.028) -2.956** (0.045) -3.287** (0.053) -2.966** (0.072) -2.957** (0.08) -2.308** (0.114) 
M_A   0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) -0.001** (<0.000) 0.000 (<0.000) 0.003** (<0.000) 0.005** (<0.000) 0.013** (<0.000) 
M_L   -0.034** (0.002) -0.077** (0.003) -0.164** (0.005) -0.224** (0.006) -0.388** (0.007) -0.440** (0.007) -0.583** (0.007) 
Vol   -0.384** (0.030) -0.835** (0.053) -1.920** (0.128) -2.524** (0.158) -3.792** (0.222) -4.051** (0.239) -3.914** (0.267) 
B_A   42.164** (1.521) 107.783** (2.572) 282.388** (4.298) 358.257** (5.027) 502.705** (6.199) 542.377** (6.641) 593.97** (7.626) 
MAgg   -0.210** (0.014) -0.130** (0.020) -0.221** (0.028) -0.271** (0.032) -0.231** (0.049) -0.188** (0.057) -0.132 (0.096) 
Agg   0.120** (0.015) 0.542** (0.022) 0.879** (0.031) 0.945** (0.035) 1.353** (0.050) 1.416** (0.060) 1.529** (0.099) 
VAgg   0.242** (0.033) 0.969** (0.043) 1.110** (0.056) 0.741** (0.065) 0.437** (0.102) 0.277* (0.120) -0.290 (0.207) 
Split   0.870** (0.013) 0.753** (0.018) 0.063* (0.025) -0.050 (0.029) -0.165** (0.044) -0.247** (0.053) -0.467** (0.091) 
Large · MAgg  0.787** (0.026) 0.973** (0.033) 1.782** (0.044) 1.984** (0.051) 2.252** (0.076) 2.187** (0.090) 1.312** (0.155) 
Large · Agg   -0.014 (0.034) 0.078 (0.046) 0.599** (0.066) 0.765** (0.078) 1.182** (0.120) 1.224** (0.153) 1.023** (0.258) 
Large · VAgg  -0.080 (0.050) 0.520** (0.07) 1.187** (0.091) 1.204** (0.118) 2.189** (0.203) 2.440** (0.241) 2.985** (0.402) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.017  0.035  0.082  0.098  0.100  0.089  0.055  
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. Notes: OLS, White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. */** denotes statistical significance at 95%/99% level. Standard errors in parentheses. M_A = Market 
activity, M_L = Market liquidity (mio), Vol = 60-second volatility (%), B_A = Bid-ask spread (%), MAgg = Moderately aggressive limit order, Agg = Aggressive limit order, VAgg = Very aggressive limit order, Split = Split 
order, Large = Limit order > 1 mio. See Sections 4.1–4.3 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Table 7: Change in EUR/JPY market liquidity (mio) and EUR/JPY net limit order book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 751,239) 
 
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in market liquidity 0.114  0.122  0.092  0.108  0.176  0.204  0.194  
Constant   1.522** (0.020) 2.387** (0.025) 3.160** (0.027) 3.886** (0.029) 5.230** (0.031) 5.767** (0.031) 6.212** (0.029) 
M_A   0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 
M_L   -0.204** (0.004) -0.306** (0.005) -0.382** (0.005) -0.471** (0.005) -0.628** (0.005) -0.695** (0.005) -0.845** (0.004) 
Vol   -4.613** (0.477) -7.640** (0.563) -11.303** (0.626) -15.301** (0.639) -13.517** (0.685) -12.449** (0.696) -1.342 (0.717) 
B_A   -4.466** (0.593) -12.913** (0.746) -21.937** (0.820) -25.531** (0.855) -40.692** (0.910) -42.812** (0.907) -30.560** (0.762) 
MAgg   -0.037** (0.011) 0.008 (0.013) 0.038** (0.014) 0.040** (0.015) 0.084** (0.016) 0.038* (0.017) 0.059** (0.017) 
Agg   -0.066** (0.012) -0.032* (0.014) -0.191** (0.015) -0.159** (0.016) -0.168** (0.017) -0.189** (0.018) -0.066** (0.018) 
VAgg   0.182** (0.015) 0.233** (0.018) 0.673** (0.021) 0.682** (0.022) 0.562** (0.024) 0.406** (0.024) 0.181** (0.024) 
Split   0.375** (0.008) 0.380** (0.009) 0.268** (0.010) 0.233** (0.011) 0.177** (0.012) 0.187** (0.012) 0.167** (0.012) 
Large · MAgg  0.115** (0.017) 0.170** (0.020) 0.099** (0.021) 0.141** (0.022) 0.211** (0.025) 0.256** (0.025) 0.375** (0.026) 
Large · Agg   -0.075 (0.087) -0.208 (0.108) -0.395** (0.117) -0.821** (0.119) -0.867** (0.109) -0.722** (0.108) -0.513** (0.099) 
Large · VAgg  0.226** (0.044) 0.126* (0.062) -0.624** (0.072) -0.873** (0.076) -1.089** (0.075) -0.977** (0.075) -0.607** (0.074) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.102   0.159   0.209   0.264   0.340   0.373   0.443   
               
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in net limit order book 0.227  0.223  -0.203  -0.228  0.117  0.462  0.802  
Constant   -0.269** (0.016) -0.596** (0.023) -1.386** (0.036) -1.566** (0.041) -1.681** (0.053) -1.307** (0.061) -2.316** (0.091) 
M_A   0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.000 (<0.000) 0.000 (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) -0.001** (<0.000) 
M_L   -0.018** (0.002) -0.053** (0.003) -0.142** (0.005) -0.197** (0.006) -0.278** (0.006) -0.323** (0.006) -0.329** (0.007) 
Vol   -1.073* (0.510) -1.997** (0.661) -5.814** (0.970) -3.291** (1.096) 22.221** (1.457) 40.469** (1.775) 123.368** (2.845) 
B_A   16.635** (0.467) 41.266** (0.732) 95.069** (1.192) 119.359** (1.416) 143.612** (1.686) 138.571** (1.839) 133.492** (2.528) 
MAgg   0.120** (0.011) 0.142** (0.014) 0.005 (0.018) -0.063** (0.021) -0.215** (0.032) -0.347** (0.038) -0.312** (0.061) 
Agg   0.166** (0.011) 0.277** (0.015) 0.240** (0.020) 0.196** (0.023) 0.048 (0.034) -0.087* (0.04) -0.086 (0.064) 
VAgg   0.296** (0.014) 0.380** (0.018) 0.166** (0.024) 0.039 (0.029) -0.184** (0.043) -0.474** (0.052) -0.464** (0.084) 
Split   0.739** (0.007) 0.693** (0.009) 0.363** (0.012) 0.268** (0.014) 0.042 (0.022) -0.004 (0.027) -0.153** (0.046) 
Large · MAgg  -0.026 (0.016) 0.111** (0.020) 0.618** (0.026) 0.895** (0.030) 1.428** (0.047) 1.613** (0.058) 1.392** (0.096) 
Large · Agg   -0.479** (0.065) -0.370** (0.080) -0.209 (0.115) -0.087 (0.129) 0.528** (0.172) 0.785** (0.205) 1.298** (0.315) 
Large · VAgg  0.074* (0.036) 0.592** (0.052) 0.771** (0.078) 0.575** (0.091) 0.958** (0.127) 1.165** (0.159) 1.470** (0.233) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.019  0.021  0.045  0.054  0.037  0.030  0.014  
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. Notes: OLS, White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. */** denotes statistical significance at 95%/99% level. Standard errors in parentheses. M_A = Market 
activity, M_L = Market liquidity (mio), Vol = 60-second volatility (%), B_A = Bid-ask spread (%), MAgg = Moderately aggressive limit order, Agg = Aggressive limit order, VAgg = Very aggressive limit order, Split = Split 
order, Large = Limit order > 1 mio. See Sections 4.1–4.3 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Table 8: Change in EUR/SEK market liquidity (mio) and EUR/SEK net limit order book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 47,473) 
 
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in market liquidity -0.007  -0.009  -0.012  -0.013  -0.013  -0.014  -0.011  
Constant   -0.014 (0.009) -0.019* (0.010) -0.038** (0.011) -0.045** (0.012) 0.010 (0.014) 0.044** (0.013) 0.054** (0.016) 
M_A   0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 
M_L   0.028** (0.005) 0.028** (0.005) 0.037** (0.006) 0.041** (0.006) 0.017** (0.006) 0.001 (0.005) -0.015* (0.006) 
Vol   -0.332** (0.041) -0.374** (0.045) -0.457** (0.048) -0.505** (0.049) -0.314** (0.043) -0.219** (0.039) -0.134** (0.04) 
B_A   -0.301** (0.027) -0.296** (0.026) -0.274** (0.027) -0.287** (0.028) -0.343** (0.030) -0.403** (0.030) -0.210** (0.028) 
MAgg   -0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) -0.004 (0.005) 
Agg   -0.019** (0.002) -0.019** (0.003) -0.022** (0.004) -0.023** (0.004) -0.031** (0.005) -0.030** (0.005) -0.025** (0.006) 
VAgg   0.016** (0.002) 0.019** (0.003) 0.014** (0.004) 0.014** (0.004) 0.000 (0.005) -0.004 (0.005) -0.006 (0.006) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.057    0.058    0.061    0.063    0.038    0.036    0.011   
               
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in net limit order book 0.235  0.321  0.405  0.473  0.695  0.792  0.946  
Constant   0.105** (0.027) 0.140** (0.028) 0.435** (0.029) 0.582** (0.031) 0.959** (0.035) 1.228** (0.036) 1.886** (0.038) 
M_A   0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) 0.003** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) -0.001** (<0.000) 
M_L   0.082** (0.009) 0.091** (0.010) -0.012 (0.011) -0.070** (0.012) -0.180** (0.014) -0.224** (0.015) -0.438** (0.016) 
Vol   -0.855** (0.063) -1.047** (0.067) -0.968** (0.074) -0.976** (0.077) -0.587** (0.075) -0.333** (0.078) -0.350** (0.077) 
B_A   2.593** (0.069) 3.309** (0.069) 2.543** (0.067) 2.231** (0.069) 1.327** (0.075) 0.953** (0.075) 0.549** (0.072) 
MAgg   -0.310** (0.019) -0.362** (0.019) -0.316** (0.019) -0.264** (0.019) -0.084** (0.020) -0.093** (0.019) -0.062** (0.020) 
Agg   -0.601** (0.019) -0.716** (0.019) -0.607** (0.020) -0.543** (0.020) -0.376** (0.021) -0.401** (0.021) -0.330** (0.021) 
VAgg   -0.511** (0.019) -0.631** (0.019) -0.501** (0.019) -0.434** (0.020) -0.266** (0.021) -0.306** (0.021) -0.214** (0.022) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.074    0.109    0.063    0.053    0.034    0.029    0.034   
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. Notes: OLS, White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. */** denotes statistical significance at 95%/99% level. Standard errors in parentheses. M_A = Market 
activity, M_L = Market liquidity (mio), Vol = 60-second volatility (%), B_A = Bid-ask spread (%), MAgg = Moderately aggressive limit order, Agg = Aggressive limit order, VAgg = Very aggressive limit order. See Sections 
4.1–4.3 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Table 9: Change in EUR/NOK market liquidity (mio) and EUR/NOK net limit order book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 36,063) 
 
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in market liquidity -0.013  -0.015  -0.019  -0.021  -0.022  -0.020  -0.024  
Constant   -0.067** (0.015) -0.078** (0.016) -0.101** (0.017) -0.079** (0.017) -0.044* (0.019) -0.015 (0.019) 0.083** (0.022) 
M_A   0.000** (<0.000) 0.000 (<0.000) 0.000 (<0.000) 0.000 (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.000* (<0.000) 0.000 (<0.000) 
M_L   0.070** (0.006) 0.075** (0.006) 0.088** (0.007) 0.082** (0.007) 0.069** (0.007) 0.049** (0.006) 0.004 (0.007) 
Vol   -0.125** (0.026) -0.196** (0.031) -0.255** (0.035) -0.314** (0.036) -0.214** (0.033) -0.175** (0.030) -0.036 (0.028) 
B_A   -0.261** (0.027) -0.248** (0.028) -0.333** (0.030) -0.385** (0.032) -0.486** (0.035) -0.437** (0.033) -0.438** (0.033) 
MAgg   -0.026** (0.005) -0.028** (0.006) -0.023** (0.008) -0.025** (0.007) -0.025** (0.008) -0.023** (0.008) -0.038** (0.009) 
Agg   -0.029** (0.005) -0.033** (0.006) -0.027** (0.008) -0.029** (0.007) -0.029** (0.008) -0.030** (0.009) -0.053** (0.009) 
VAgg   -0.004 (0.007) -0.006 (0.007) 0.002 (0.009) -0.001 (0.008) 0.003 (0.009) 0.000 (0.010) -0.028** (0.011) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.076    0.074    0.085    0.095    0.080    0.063    0.033   
               
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in net limit order book 0.238  0.312  0.383  0.440  0.653  0.763  0.948  
Constant   0.057 (0.038) -0.022 (0.037) 0.293** (0.040) 0.420** (0.042) 0.893** (0.048) 1.159** (0.048) 2.004** (0.050) 
M_A   0.001** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) -0.001** (<0.000) 
M_L   0.152** (0.009) 0.205** (0.01) 0.129** (0.012) 0.078** (0.013) -0.039* (0.016) -0.104** (0.016) -0.377** (0.017) 
Vol   -0.273** (0.058) -0.322** (0.062) -0.472** (0.066) -0.540** (0.074) -0.244** (0.079) -0.187** (0.072) -0.147 (0.081) 
B_A   2.411** (0.065) 3.125** (0.066) 2.368** (0.069) 2.083** (0.074) 1.253** (0.082) 0.951** (0.080) -0.357** (0.089) 
MAgg   -0.444** (0.033) -0.512** (0.030) -0.518** (0.031) -0.450** (0.032) -0.335** (0.033) -0.287** (0.032) -0.137** (0.033) 
Agg   -0.673** (0.033) -0.775** (0.030) -0.717** (0.031) -0.630** (0.032) -0.553** (0.033) -0.546** (0.032) -0.429** (0.034) 
VAgg   -0.513** (0.035) -0.656** (0.032) -0.467** (0.035) -0.361** (0.036) -0.270** (0.038) -0.251** (0.038) -0.105** (0.040) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.064    0.095    0.058    0.044    0.026    0.026    0.046   
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. Notes: OLS, White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. */** denotes statistical significance at 95%/99% level. Standard errors in parentheses. M_A = Market 
activity, M_L = Market liquidity (mio), Vol = 60-second volatility (%), B_A = Bid-ask spread (%), MAgg = Moderately aggressive limit order, Agg = Aggressive limit order, VAgg = Very aggressive limit order. See Sections 
4.1–4.3 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Table 10: Change in USD/TRY market liquidity (mio) and USD/TRY net limit order book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 38,499) 
 
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in market liquidity 0.027  0.026  0.032  0.029  0.023  0.024  0.049  
Constant   0.761** (0.017) 0.813** (0.017) 0.910** (0.018) 0.916** (0.018) 1.165** (0.02) 1.202** (0.021) 1.447** (0.023) 
M_A   0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 
M_L   -0.289** (0.007) -0.310** (0.007) -0.343** (0.007) -0.347** (0.008) -0.446** (0.008) -0.465** (0.009) -0.554** (0.009) 
Vol   -1.240** (0.089) -1.378** (0.104) -1.498** (0.115) -1.516** (0.116) -1.752** (0.137) -1.885** (0.138) -1.667** (0.138) 
B_A   -2.201** (0.068) -2.293** (0.070) -2.664** (0.077) -2.680** (0.077) -3.266** (0.087) -3.290** (0.086) -4.186** (0.104) 
MAgg   0.099** (0.008) 0.093** (0.009) 0.101** (0.009) 0.091** (0.009) 0.080** (0.010) 0.104** (0.010) 0.143** (0.012) 
Agg   0.015** (0.004) 0.011* (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005) -0.013** (0.005) -0.011* (0.005) -0.017** (0.006) 
VAgg   -0.048** (0.013) -0.046** (0.013) 0.008 (0.015) 0.007 (0.015) 0.031 (0.017) 0.057** (0.017) 0.175** (0.020) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.115    0.123    0.129    0.128    0.165    0.172    0.186   
               
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in net limit order book 0.249  0.276  0.378  0.458  0.680  0.796  1.049  
Constant   0.368** (0.024) 0.450** (0.027) 0.609** (0.029) 0.714** (0.031) 1.057** (0.034) 1.287** (0.036) 1.690** (0.036) 
M_A   0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) 0.002** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 
M_L   -0.107** (0.009) -0.149** (0.010) -0.184** (0.011) -0.198** (0.012) -0.221** (0.013) -0.254** (0.014) -0.285** (0.014) 
Vol   -1.056** (0.174) -0.967** (0.183) -1.144** (0.202) -0.850** (0.214) -0.561* (0.224) -0.505* (0.229) -1.143** (0.230) 
B_A   -2.435** (0.113) -2.314** (0.119) -1.939** (0.124) -1.899** (0.134) -2.900** (0.145) -3.484** (0.153) -3.447** (0.165) 
MAgg   0.516** (0.017) 0.489** (0.019) 0.430** (0.019) 0.392** (0.019) 0.373** (0.021) 0.399** (0.022) 0.436** (0.022) 
Agg   0.291** (0.008) 0.343** (0.009) 0.320** (0.009) 0.273** (0.009) 0.223** (0.010) 0.212** (0.011) 0.140** (0.011) 
VAgg   1.248** (0.025) 1.267** (0.026) 1.211** (0.025) 1.171** (0.027) 1.227** (0.030) 1.264** (0.030) 1.232** (0.032) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.117    0.108    0.096    0.086    0.075    0.075    0.069   
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. Notes: OLS, White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. */** denotes statistical significance at 95%/99% level. Standard errors in parentheses. M_A = Market 
activity, M_L = Market liquidity (mio), Vol = 60-second volatility (%), B_A = Bid-ask spread (%), MAgg = Moderately aggressive limit order, Agg = Aggressive limit order, VAgg = Very aggressive limit order. See Sections 
4.1–4.3 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Table 11: Change in USD/MXN market liquidity (mio) and USD/MXN net limit order book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 127,833) 
 
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in market liquidity -0.094  -0.087  -0.057  -0.058  -0.052  -0.074  -0.067  
Constant   0.714** (0.018) 0.746** (0.019) 0.824** (0.022) 0.887** (0.025) 1.195** (0.035) 1.323** (0.039) 1.750** (0.049) 
M_A   -0.001** (<0.000) -0.001** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.000 (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) -0.001** (<0.000) 
M_L   -0.198** (0.003) -0.201** (0.003) -0.219** (0.004) -0.238** (0.004) -0.300** (0.004) -0.325** (0.005) -0.410** (0.005) 
Vol   0.116** (0.045) 0.140** (0.050) 0.103 (0.056) 0.047 (0.06) -0.094 (0.066) 0.143* (0.069) 0.320** (0.071) 
B_A   -1.208** (0.045) -1.338** (0.050) -1.488** (0.055) -1.602** (0.059) -1.869** (0.064) -2.213** (0.067) -2.808** (0.072) 
MAgg   -0.111** (0.015) -0.117** (0.016) -0.134** (0.018) -0.149** (0.022) -0.268** (0.032) -0.312** (0.037) -0.400** (0.047) 
Agg   -0.115** (0.016) -0.113** (0.017) -0.148** (0.019) -0.165** (0.023) -0.304** (0.033) -0.342** (0.038) -0.462** (0.047) 
VAgg   -0.635** (0.019) -0.652** (0.020) -0.625** (0.022) -0.616** (0.025) -0.689** (0.034) -0.716** (0.039) -0.752** (0.048) 
Split   0.172 (0.156) 0.062 (0.165) -0.069 (0.151) -0.190 (0.134) -0.221 (0.128) -0.409** (0.132) -0.172 (0.171) 
Large · MAgg  0.018** (0.007) 0.026** (0.007) 0.006 (0.008) 0.010 (0.009) -0.004 (0.010) 0.014 (0.011) 0.028* (0.012) 
Large · Agg   0.043** (0.014) 0.027 (0.015) -0.053** (0.018) -0.067** (0.019) -0.224** (0.022) -0.261** (0.023) -0.403** (0.026) 
Large · VAgg  1.017** (0.038) 0.985** (0.039) 0.730** (0.041) 0.670** (0.041) 0.502** (0.041) 0.446** (0.041) 0.248** (0.041) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.150  0.140  0.111  0.115  0.133  0.142  0.167  
               
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in net limit order book 1.013  1.063  1.292  1.456  1.871  2.141  2.354  
Constant   -0.020 (0.032) -0.031 (0.034) 0.011 (0.042) 0.022 (0.047) 0.536** (0.066) 0.881** (0.067) 1.458** (0.073) 
M_A   0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.000** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 0.001** (<0.000) 
M_L   0.059** (0.003) 0.067** (0.004) 0.083** (0.004) 0.082** (0.004) 0.064** (0.005) 0.062** (0.005) 0.061** (0.005) 
Vol   -1.582** (0.074) -1.607** (0.078) -1.794** (0.085) -1.907** (0.089) -1.899** (0.101) -2.373** (0.110) -2.148** (0.121) 
B_A   1.443** (0.079) 1.581** (0.082) 1.531** (0.089) 1.661** (0.094) 1.516** (0.106) 1.789** (0.115) 2.344** (0.135) 
MAgg   0.402** (0.030) 0.399** (0.032) 0.394** (0.041) 0.471** (0.046) 0.197** (0.064) -0.021 (0.066) -0.569** (0.071) 
Agg   -0.026 (0.031) -0.019 (0.033) 0.031 (0.042) 0.078 (0.047) -0.155* (0.065) -0.376** (0.067) -0.867** (0.073) 
VAgg   1.206** (0.033) 1.216** (0.035) 1.219** (0.044) 1.316** (0.049) 1.049** (0.067) 0.846** (0.069) 0.366** (0.075) 
Split   0.382 (0.331) 0.474 (0.342) 0.449 (0.345) 0.604 (0.353) 0.871* (0.339) 1.074** (0.326) 0.609 (0.381) 
Large · MAgg  1.605** (0.019) 1.711** (0.019) 2.326** (0.021) 2.603** (0.021) 3.226** (0.022) 3.484** (0.021) 3.826** (0.022) 
Large · Agg   0.702** (0.025) 0.865** (0.027) 1.414** (0.032) 1.699** (0.033) 2.412** (0.035) 2.765** (0.032) 3.130** (0.035) 
Large · VAgg  1.456** (0.047) 1.582** (0.048) 2.359** (0.056) 2.688** (0.057) 3.320** (0.060) 3.652** (0.057) 4.041** (0.058) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.130  0.133  0.172  0.199  0.230  0.271  0.269  
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. Notes: OLS, White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. */** denotes statistical significance at 95%/99% level. Standard errors in parentheses. M_A = Market 
activity, M_L = Market liquidity (mio), Vol = 60-second volatility (%), B_A = Bid-ask spread (%), MAgg = Moderately aggressive limit order, Agg = Aggressive limit order, VAgg = Very aggressive limit order, Split = Split 
order, Large = Limit order > 1 mio. See Sections 4.1–4.3 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Table 12: Change in USD/RUB market liquidity (mio) and USD/RUB net limit order book (mio) (8-13 September 2010, included observations: 31,778) 
 
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in market liquidity 0.471  0.687  1.064  1.175  1.389  1.477  1.406  
Constant   0.641** (0.063) 0.961** (0.081) 1.312** (0.114) 1.533** (0.123) 2.895** (0.201) 3.723** (0.221) 7.563** (0.232) 
M_A   -0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) -0.005* (0.002) -0.006* (0.003) -0.008** (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) 
M_L   -0.065** (0.003) -0.090** (0.004) -0.115** (0.007) -0.126** (0.007) -0.213** (0.014) -0.268** (0.016) -0.533** (0.016) 
Vol   1.362** (0.452) 0.634 (0.448) 0.053 (0.516) -0.434 (0.542) -0.393 (0.737) -0.464 (0.746) -4.639** (0.898) 
B_A   4.249** (0.413) 6.732** (0.416) 7.638** (0.440) 8.108** (0.488) 4.279** (0.558) 1.221* (0.616) -8.709** (0.986) 
MAgg   0.709** (0.048) 1.022** (0.063) 1.597** (0.083) 1.867** (0.088) 2.522** (0.117) 3.104** (0.133) 4.167** (0.170) 
Agg   0.623** (0.060) 0.771** (0.079) 1.330** (0.109) 1.520** (0.118) 1.830** (0.163) 1.976** (0.179) 2.345** (0.212) 
VAgg   2.274** (0.245) 3.070** (0.286) 3.720** (0.339) 3.764** (0.332) 3.673** (0.364) 3.886** (0.376) 4.734** (0.444) 
Split   0.097 (0.173) -0.103 (0.193) -0.190 (0.220) -0.206 (0.240) -0.255 (0.285) -0.092 (0.277) 0.631 (0.389) 
Large · MAgg  -0.496** (0.042) -0.819** (0.052) -1.209** (0.070) -1.377** (0.075) -1.736** (0.098) -2.093** (0.108) -2.891** (0.126) 
Large · Agg   0.318** (0.058) 0.186** (0.071) 0.008 (0.097) -0.199 (0.108) -0.182 (0.135) -0.065 (0.146) 0.088 (0.171) 
Large · VAgg  -1.306** (0.295) -1.657** (0.336) -2.091** (0.383) -2.077** (0.382) -1.796** (0.413) -1.642** (0.429) -1.918** (0.49) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.052  0.064  0.059  0.058  0.078  0.099  0.232  
               
Time window (seconds)  0.1  0.2  0.5  1  5  10  60  
Change in net limit order book 3.384  8.054  8.777  8.870  8.895  9.155  12.825  
Constant   3.413** (0.153) 6.428** (0.180) 6.420** (0.193) 6.717** (0.195) 6.669** (0.217) 6.735** (0.245) 11.748** (0.436) 
M_A   -0.012** (0.003) -0.020** (0.003) -0.021** (0.003) -0.022** (0.003) -0.024** (0.003) -0.026** (0.004) -0.036** (0.008) 
M_L   -0.109** (0.006) -0.111** (0.007) -0.132** (0.008) -0.134** (0.008) -0.133** (0.010) -0.136** (0.011) -0.334** (0.023) 
Vol   4.602** (0.783) 3.830** (0.922) 5.649** (1.020) 4.740** (1.054) 3.974** (1.210) 3.846** (1.199) 1.823 (2.171) 
B_A   8.413** (0.716) 3.945** (0.870) 6.705** (0.862) 6.305** (0.881) 7.136** (1.000) 7.742** (1.060) -11.242** (1.885) 
MAgg   2.464** (0.148) 6.496** (0.173) 8.302** (0.179) 8.123** (0.178) 7.703** (0.191) 7.961** (0.214) 12.035** (0.324) 
Agg   1.542** (0.168) 4.843** (0.199) 6.653** (0.205) 6.580** (0.206) 7.388** (0.223) 8.096** (0.255) 13.588** (0.401) 
VAgg   6.906** (0.410) 11.693** (0.474) 13.744** (0.512) 14.267** (0.486) 14.355** (0.535) 15.572** (0.592) 23.125** (0.967) 
Split   8.728** (0.306) 5.900** (0.347) 4.866** (0.338) 4.457** (0.375) 4.055** (0.398) 3.895** (0.421) 4.408** (0.645) 
Large · MAgg  -2.215** (0.108) -5.496** (0.121) -7.101** (0.123) -7.072** (0.124) -6.636** (0.139) -6.878** (0.156) -10.196** (0.250) 
Large · Agg   -1.235** (0.129) -3.559** (0.152) -5.086** (0.152) -5.130** (0.157) -5.696** (0.175) -6.098** (0.200) -9.216** (0.334) 
Large · VAgg  -3.005** (0.426) -5.935** (0.486) -7.835** (0.528) -8.224** (0.507) -7.635** (0.566) -8.733** (0.627) -11.964** (1.036) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.079  0.127  0.181  0.178  0.142  0.127  0.128  
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. Notes: OLS, White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. */** denotes statistical significance at 95%/99% level. Standard errors in parentheses. M_A = Market 
activity, M_L = Market liquidity (mio), Vol = 60-second volatility (%), B_A = Bid-ask spread (%), MAgg = Moderately aggressive limit order, Agg = Aggressive limit order, VAgg = Very aggressive limit order, Split = Split 
order, Large = Limit order > 1 mio. See Sections 4.1–4.3 for detailed definitions of the variables. 
